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FREEDOM OF RELIGION AND FREEDOM FROM 
RELIGION:  THE EUROPEAN MODEL 
JHH Weiler* 
I 
What place may religion have in our public space?  In our definition of the 
State? In our educational systems?  In defining our public identity?  It is, in part, a 
question of and for democracy: Imagine a State with a majority of practicing 
Christians among its citizens.  May they use the legislative and administrative 
institutions of the State to make theirs a Christian State?  Would that not run up 
against our most cherished constitutional principles of freedom, notably freedom of 
religion and freedom from religion?  The impact of the French and American 
revolutions on our political and constitutional cultures is so enduring and powerful 
that we tend to take the American ‘separationist’ and French ‘laique’ (secular state) 
as normative, as setting the yardstick for any thinking on this issue. And thus, the 
most “natural” answer to the question:  A Christian State?  Nooooo!  
There is, interestingly, a paucity, in the discussion of these issues, of normative 
comparative analysis.  By normative comparative analysis I mean a comparative 
analysis of systems in liberal societies which offer an alternative to the 
Franco/American model.  You would almost think that the latter is typical, whereas 
it is, even among Western democracies, the exception rather than the rule.  The fact 
that it is exceptional does not mean that normatively it is not compelling or more 
compelling than the alternatives.  But that must be an informed judgment call.  
At this point in the literature, one usually finds a turn to discussion of other 
arrangements of Church and State to demonstrate alternatives to the 
Franco/American model—such as the German Cooperative model, the British or 
Danish or Maltese Establishment models, or the Greek or Polish Endorsement 
models, etc.  
The literature in this area performs a disservice, as it conflates the relationship 
between Church and State with the issue of identity.  Allow me to explain—by 
making three “moves.”  
First Move:  State and Nation.  The very framing of the issue as Church–State 
is itself a creature of the French and American Revolutions, which loads the dice, 
for it conflates State with Nation.  The reason it can do this so ‘nonchalantly’ is that 
both France and the United States conflate nationality with citizenship in an 
uncomplicated—but also, let me emphasize, in an, empirically-speaking, 
exceptional—way.  
More commonly, the emergence of the modern State is tied to the emergence 
of the modern nation-state (or a new self-understanding of old states) and the 
concept of self-determination.  The Self of the State is the nation.  German 
unification, that conglomeration of the territory of what became modern Germany 
out of dozens of little principalities—the Bismarck enterprise—was also co-
terminus in inventing, creating, and then consolidating the notion of a unified 
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German people.  The Italian State—the Risorgimento—was not only a territorial 
fusion on the Italian peninsula, it also reflected the belief that there was something 
that transcended the previous separateness: the Italian nation. Older states came to 
understand themselves in similar fashion.  And so it was after World War I (WWI), 
and again after World War II (WWII), with de-colonization, and as recently as the 
fall of the Soviet empire.  
Second Move:  Religion.  There is much more to religion—notably in the 
Abrahamic religions—than religious sensibility properly speaking.  They all have 
or have had a huge impact on our cultural asset, not least our political cultural 
asset—and consequently on our identitarian asset.  Sometimes their cultural asset is 
directly manifested through literature, poetry, the plastic arts, and music. 
Sometimes it is indirect, shaping our sensibility to the human condition in profound 
ways.  Given the historical prevalence of the Judeo-Christian tradition in the West, 
it is impossible to understand political culture—even secular political culture, even 
the cultural identity of the most laique of persons—without this asset being in the 
background.  The recent speech given by Nicolas Sarkozy about the Christian roots 
of France was not an evangelizing appeal or referent—it was a reference to the 
cultural dimension of Christianity which is indispensible to an understanding and, 
in his view, self-understanding of secular France.  The famous WWII essay of 
Benedetto Croce has always been understood in a similar sense.  
Third Move:  Religion and Nation.  In the emergence of the nation in the 
modern nation-state or the new national self understanding of older states, religion, 
in this thick cultural sense, could and did become an important and at times 
constitutive element in the self-understanding of persons as a collective people.  In 
short, in the cultural make-up of the nation, religion may play a huge part even for 
those who have abandoned its deistic content.   
In the emergence of modern Ireland, through its struggle to become a state 
independent from Protestant Britain, Catholicism was among the most salient 
elements of national self-understanding.  The preamble to the Irish Constitution till 
this day has a flowery reference to explicit Catholic imagery, with the Holy Trinity 
being defined as the source of truth, beauty, and justice.  This, of course, is in an 
Ireland that recognized—in the same Constitution—the full and equal citizenship 
of Protestants, Jews, and, naturally, atheists.  To have full-fledged Jewish citizens 
who could, say, vote for and be elected to the Irish Parliament, and serve in the 
highest offices of the State as full and equal citizens, was not considered to be in 
contradiction with a Constitutional self-understanding of the Holy Trinity as being 
the source of all truth, beauty, and justice—and was not regarded as contradictory 
or insulting by the many who did not share that vision.  
Let me bring these ‘three moves’ to a sharp conclusion:  Religion is not 
something that emerges when we discuss the relationship between State and 
Church.  It can predate the State and be part of the identity of the very nation of 
which the State is an expression.  Religion may belong to the fundamental notion 
of Self-Determination.  Scrubbing out religion from the collective and public space 
may compromise that primordial “right” of self-determination.  
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II 
Keeping this in mind, then, let us turn to the contemporary debate about the 
place of religion in European public space—a debate which has assumed sharper 
edges with the advent of large and vibrant religious Muslim societies in Europe 
today, in the face of both a Christianity which has been continuously losing ground 
in an ever-secular Europe, and a corresponding decline in the role of Christian 
culture in the self-understanding of the European nations and nation-states.  There 
was, as you will recall, a huge discussion about the possible reference to “Christian 
Roots” as part of the Identikit of the European Union in the Preamble to its now-
defunct “Constitution.”  Now questions arise in national contexts—with the debate, 
for example, on the appropriateness of a crucifix in public schools, which has been 
litigated before the German Constitutional Court, is under legislative consideration 
in several countries, and was the subject of consideration by the Grand Chamber of 
the ECHR following the November 2009 Lautsi decision by the Second Chamber.1  
It is hard to recall any ECHR litigation in recent times that has attracted as much 
public and media attention. Relate the discussion on the cross to that on the burqa 
and you have your finger on the constitutional pulse in and of Europe. 
I want to offer a somewhat novel, and surely contestable, way of framing the 
issues as they manifest themselves today. 
III 
We habitually talk of the commitment to religious freedom, both positive and 
negative—freedom of religion and freedom from religion—which European states 
are constitutionally, and under the Convention system, obligated to guarantee their 
citizens and residents.   
In fact, I would suggest, the European constitutional landscape posits two, 
rather than one, “Freedom of Religion.”  In addition to the classical individual 
Freedom of and from Religion, in its very structure Europe represents a second 
collective, identitarian, Freedom, conceptually stemming from self-determination, 
namely the freedom of nation-states to include in their self-definition, in their self-
understanding and in their national and statal symbology, a more or less robust 
entanglement of religion and religious symbols.  (Right ‘off the bat’ let me say that 
there is no small measure of hypocrisy in the oft-heard insistence that Turkey must 
be laïque—Turkey yes but Denmark no?) 
 Consider France and the United Kingdom, good examples because both are 
founding members of the European Convention on Human Rights and, despite the 
usual imperfections, are both considered robust liberal democracies in good 
standing.  
France, in its very Constitution, defines itself as laïque—usually understood as 
a political doctrine which does not allow the State any endorsement or support of 
religion—and would, say, consider the display of religious symbols by the State or 
the funding of religious schools, as, well, anathema.  At an individual level, 
“laïcité” (secularism) does not necessarily mean individual atheism or agnosticism. 
I know many persons, and so do you, who are religious in a profound and 
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capacious way, but uphold laïcité.  They do so because they believe, independently 
of their personal conviction, that it is wrong for the State to get entangled with 
religion.  This precision is important since it helps highlight the fact that laïcité is a 
political doctrine that articulates the best way to regulate the relationship between 
the State and Religion.  The origins of, and justification for, laïcité can be historical 
(e.g., the specificities of the Ancien Régime and the subsequent French Revolution), 
but also theoretical—rooted in both principled and pragmatic considerations of, 
say, how best the State may ensure peaceful coexistence among religious factions.  
Laïcité is to be contrasted with an opposing doctrine, which is also very 
common in Europe but which has no broadly accepted name.  “Theocracy,” even 
the most ardent supporters of French-style laïcité would agree, would not be an 
appropriate label to describe a state like the modern UK or Denmark.  For 
convenience let us refer to ‘non-laïque’ states.  Like France, and like everyone else, 
the non-laïque are both committed to, and obligated by, an imperative of assuring 
individual freedom of and from religion—but they see no wrong in a religious, or 
religiously rooted, self-understanding of nation and state, and in a public space 
more or less replete with state-endorsed religious symbology.  In England, part of 
the UK, the Monarch is not only the Head of State, but also the titular head of the 
Anglican faith and its institutional manifestation in the Church of England, the 
“Established Church” of the Nation and State.  Many state functions have a 
religious character: clergy sit (or sat) ex-officio as part of the legislature, the flag 
carries the cross (of St. George), and the national anthem is a prayer to God.  
In somewhat of a mirror image of what I wrote above, I know, and so do you, 
many persons in England who are very convinced atheists and yet see no harm in 
the ‘non-laïque’ state.  They are also able to invoke considerations of principle and 
pragmatism:  Has the UK been more riddled with religious strife than, say, France?  
It would seem that at least until recently, Catholics, Jews, and Muslims were at 
peace with, say, a photo of the Monarch on the wall of a classroom.  More 
significantly, the English (or British) population at large has been at peace with a 
Catholic, Jewish, Muslim, or Church of England classroom funded from the 
general tax receipts of a population which is mostly secular, just as their French 
counterparts would be uncomfortable with the above.  
It is not my purpose to claim normative parity for these two positions—a 
proposition which makes many people become very hot under the collar.  But I will 
make two related claims.  First, both the French and the UK (English) models are 
considered constitutionally legitimate in Europe.  The UK (or Denmark, Malta, 
Greece, and many others with different recipes from the ‘non-laïque’ cookbook) is 
not, simply by being what it is, in violation of the Convention or in violation of the 
common constitutional traditions of Europe.  Second, and more controversially, I 
assert that the claim that laïcité embodies a principle of neutrality requires a very 
narrow (and self-serving) definition of what we mean by neutrality.  Sure, a laïque 
state, à la France, is neutral as between different religious factions in the French 
public space.  But it is not neutral in a broader political sense.  What may hang on a 
French classroom wall will depend on the political colour of French democracy at 
any given time: A  bust of Voltaire?  S’il Vous Plait.  Marx?  Pourquoi Pas?  The 
noble Battle Cry of the French Revolution—Liberté, Égalité, Fraternité—is, in 
fact, to be found in countless schools across the country.  The only things that may 
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not be displayed, independently of the contemporary color of voter preference, are 
a cross, a mezuzah, or a crescent.  Kids may come to school with any manner of 
emblems such as the famous peace triangle, but not with you-know-what.  
There is no contestation in Europe about the principles of freedom of and from 
religion (though there are many debates about their application).  But there is a 
deep contestation about the most suitable way to regulate the symbolic and 
iconographic entanglement of Church and State.  The laïque position is surely not 
“neutral” about that contestation:  It is as much a polar position as is the ‘non-
laïque’ position. It does not simply choose a side.  It is a side.  It is theoretically 
autistic or disingenuous to claim neutrality for a term which defines one pole in a 
bipolar dispute.   
This argument brings about yet a third very important underlying distinction 
which is rarely articulated, but which was very visible in Lautsi, since, in my view, 
it undergirded the impassioned plea by the lawyers of the redoubtable Ms. Lautsi.  
It also, in my most humble and respectful opinion, undergirded the decision of the 
Chamber that was subsequently appealed to the Grand Chamber.  There are those 
who truly believe that laïcité is a primordial condition—sine-qua-non for a good 
liberal democracy and that, at least implicitly, the non-laïque position is sub-
optimal at best and aberrational at worst.  Consequently, it is morally imperative 
for good democrats and liberal pluralists to attempt to clip the wings of religious 
manifestations of the non-laïque state as far as possible—a principled and 
consistent position.  
IV 
There are others (myself included) who hold the view that, even more in 
today’s world than before, the European version of the non-laïque state is hugely 
important in the lesson of tolerance it forces on such states and its citizens towards 
those who do not share the “official” religions, and in the example it gives the rest 
of the world of a principled mediation between a collective self-understanding 
rooted in a religious sensibility, or religious history, or religiously-inspired values, 
and the imperative exigencies of liberal democracy.  There is something inspiring 
and optimistic in the fact that, even though the Queen is the titular Head of the 
Church of England, the many Catholics, Muslims and Jews, not to mention the 
majority of atheists and agnostics, can genuinely consider her as “their Queen” too, 
and are equal citizens of England and the UK.  I think there is intrinsic value of 
incalculable worth in the European pluralism which validates both France and the 
UK as acceptable models in which the individual right to and from religion may 
take place. 
This, then, is how I would frame the issues against which the spate of cases 
and debates currently present in the European public space must take place.  All too 
often, these debates are reduced to the oft-difficult line-drawing exercises between 
freedom of and from religion and their counterbalancing by other societal mores.  
A word, then, about Europe.  The European Union constitutional framework is 
meant to reflect the common constitutional traditions of the Member States.  How 
would one achieve that when one has a France and a Britain?  A Malta and a 
Sweden?  The solution I propose is the so-called Polish solution, the elegant way in 
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which the contemporary Polish constitution catered for a society in which equal 
respect is owed to the religious and the non-religious.  Both are recognized. Europe 
could recognize both. 
V 
What is the conceptual and normative theoretical case for the transcendent 
European constitutionalism which accepts this myriad of arrangements ranging 
from the French, through the Dutch to the English?  
I would list the following considerations, which must be taken step by step.  
First, national identity is considered of moral value in and of itself, and if 
religion—as faith and/or culture—is bound up with the make-up of that collective 
identity, it partakes of that moral value. It partakes of that moral value for several 
reasons:  First, because collective self-determination is an expression of individual 
liberty and self-determination.  Why should we Irish, separate and different from 
the British in many ways, of which our predominant faith is one important element, 
not be able to be our own people, in our own State, etc.?  (The political and legal 
limits to the right of independence of national minorities within a State must be the 
subject of another paper).  Is it not odd, the argument would go, that under freedom 
of religion I may be entitled to give expression to my faith at the individual level, 
but, even if theoretically every single one of my fellow citizens feels exactly like 
me, we may not give any expression of such in the public square, in the symbology 
of our State—which flows from the definition of the State as laique as in France?  
The denial of that position is indeed deeply rooted in the heritage of the French 
Revolution, which defined religion as a private matter, even though the Abrahamic 
religions do not understand themselves as confined to the private sphere. Clearly, 
however, the British, or Danish, or Irish, or Greek, or Maltese, or Polish, etc., did 
not follow in the French footsteps, despite partaking in the same heritage.  
It is for this reason that I do not like the vocabulary of “Margin of 
Appreciation” used by the Grand Chamber in resolving the Lautsi case in favor of 
Italy.  (I like the result, but not that aspect of the reasoning).  “Margin of 
Appreciation” is premised on the notion that the Individual and his or her rights are 
at the center, and that competing values are peripheral, on the margin.   I do not 
accept that.  I think that the good life is one in which the rights of the individual are 
balanced by duties and responsibilities towards others.  I also would claim that the 
community, society, and human relations are indispensable components of the very 
human condition, so that the right of collective self-determination—how a society 
understands itself collectively—is hugely important and has to be carefully 
balanced. From this perspective, one could say, ironically and polemically, that it is 
the European Court which is operating within the Margin of Appreciation.  The 
vocabulary is so entrenched that it would be futile to call for its abandonment, but 
its philosophical and jurisprudential limitations should be acknowledged.  
Does this mean that the nation must be “pure”?  Must Britain reject or exclude 
or repress, as it once did, Catholics or Jews or Muslims or seculars who hate all 
forms of religion?  Why would the European Convention on Human Rights, one 
foundation of which is clearly the heritage of the French Revolution with its 
Declaration of the Rights of Man, accept the British model as an authentic 
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expression of its transcendent liberal values?  
The answer to all of these questions is:  of course not.  Europe is crisscrossed 
with states that contain various minorities, including religious minorities, linguistic 
minorities and, indeed, national minorities.  We now can identify the third grand 
principle which is part of the transcendent European constitutionalism.  Formalized 
already at the end of WWI, Europe accepted the legitimacy of a conceptual 
distinction between nationality and citizenship.  All citizens are equal in law, but 
this need not obliterate national distinctions—as even a cursory look at states such 
as the UK, Spain, Italy, and Belgium, to mention but a few, attest.  Various regimes 
to accommodate this distinction are in place as these same states again attest:  
Devolution in the UK, autonomy in Spain, bi-communalism in Belgium, 
differentiated regionalism in Italy with a special status for the German-speaking 
Alto Adige, etc.  
What is the normative conceptual underpinning of this third principle?  Why is 
it accepted, especially if the dominant culture is religiously defined, as in, say, 
England?  The answer, I would argue, is that allowing a religiously inspired 
identitarian asset to the state but insisting on strict non-discrimination on grounds 
of religion provides one of the most fertile grounds for cultivating one of the most 
cherished liberal virtues—that of tolerance.  It is demonstrated in the fact that 
England is formally Anglican in its symbology but practices full religious 
freedom—thus allowing Catholics and Jews not only to worship freely, but also to 
be prime minister or legislator or chief justice, to be fully integrated citizens.  This 
teaches tolerance and is in some respects inspiring.  It is one reason why Britain has 
been so attractive to immigrants, why in modern Britain its Catholic citizens can be 
as patriotic as its Protestant citizens.  It is a state of all its citizens and at the same 
time it has a powerful identitarian asset and identity which has its roots, and some 
very live manifestations, in religion.  On this paradigm, it is France that seems less 
pluralist and tolerant in insisting on a single unique French nationality/citizenship 
repressing different national identitarian communities. 
Our contemporary political theory has forgotten the lessons of Aristotle, 
Aquinas, and Maimonides who all insisted on a clear distinction between values 
(societal values) and personal virtues necessary to vindicate those values.  You will 
not defend the Patria, or freedom, if your citizens are all cowards.  If a constitutive 
liberal value is tolerance, it is not clear to me which of the two models, the French 
or the British, has a more salutary effect on the corresponding individual virtues.  It 
is arguably a sharper lesson in tolerance to say:  Though we are officially and 
formally Anglican, we will accept Catholics with absolutely no discrimination, than 
to say we are neutral and we will accept Protestant with no discrimination.  
Moreover, that tolerance and inclusiveness becomes part of our self-
understanding and self-identity.  To be English both affirms a unique identity a 
feature of which is the willingness to accept others on equal terms in the positive 
assets of citizenship.  As this translates into practice, it will, of course, have other 
cultural impacts on what it means to be English.  English cuisine is not only roast 
beef and Yorkshire pudding but also Madras curry.  As different “others” are 
integrated the self itself will change, organically.  And for the “other,” the 
interesting part of being English is the fact that one is accepted as a full citizen, that 
one can partake in the cultural asset and British traditions—despite one’s otherness.  
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Interestingly, it has elicited huge loyalty.  
Third, there is an important external dimension.  There is value not only in the 
British/Danish/Maltese, etc. model as such, but also in the overall European model 
which accepts as legitimate a France and a Holland and a Britain. Liberal 
democracies are interested in the spread of democracy beyond the old West—and 
there have been huge strides in recent years.  But large swaths of the world are 
populated by religious peoples and societies for whom the Franco-American model 
is extremely unappealing.  It seems to suggest that democracy means consigning 
religion to the private sphere as in France and America.  That democracy means 
separationism.  The Europe model accepts separationism.  But it also accepts other 
models which are more tolerant and friendly to religious society, provided that the 
binding of the religiously-inspired identity in the identitarian asset of the state does 
not compromise either freedom of religion or freedom from religion.  
VI 
There is one final little puzzle I want to address:  It is surprising that 
transcendent European constitutionalism accepts the British, Danish, etc. model, 
especially in this extreme form where there is an established State religion, given 
the rootedness of the Human Rights apparatus in the French Revolution, the 
Declaration of the Rights of Man, and the move to privatize religion.  There is, of 
course, a political explanation:  Britain, for example, was a founding Member of 
the Council of Europe and among the principal drafters of the European 
Convention on Human Rights.  But the fact that South Africa was a Charter 
Member of the UN did not make apartheid kosher.  
I think the reason for the European pluralism on this issue has deeper roots.  
First, we may note that there is an in-built tension:  The principle of Human 
Rights (which privatized religion) pushes towards the French Model.  The principle 
of Self Determination pushes towards the British model.  The European solution is 
a plausible attempt at pragmatic compromise.  In some respects it splits the 
difference in an interesting way:  It vindicates the notion of fundamental liberties 
by insisting at the level of the individual on strict freedom of and from religion, and 
on non-discrimination in the non-identitarian aspects, but recognizes self-
determination by allowing a Britain and Denmark and Malta, and Greece and 
Germany and Poland. 
Make no mistake—there will be difficult boundaries to navigate.  A law which 
ensured Anglican ascendency in elections?  That would not survive.  But the 
Monarch has to be Anglican?  That is still extant law:  It is part of being the 
Monarch, though if Prince Charles, like Tony Blair, converted to Catholicism and 
petitioned the European Court, we would have some legal fun.  
Second, the traditions of Human Rights and the dignity of man do not only 
derive from the Enlightenment, Neo-Kantianism, and the French Revolution. 
Europe’s political culture, as brilliantly illustrated by the French Historian Remy 
Brague, has always drawn on two sources—Athens and Jerusalem—and their 
evolving incarnations.  Even a modern Saint, St. Jurgen (Habermas), has come to 
acknowledge the Christian foundation of our modern tradition of Human Rights.  
The constitutional pluralism of Europe is but a manifestation of that rich, at times 
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fractious, but ultimately fecund tension and synthesis of those two traditions.  
 
